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Liability for Environmental Harm and 








Globalization is affecting law and legal systems throughout the 
world in profound new ways. With the growth of global concern for 
the environment, nations are transplanting environmental law and 
policy innovations even from countries with very different legal and 
cultural traditions. Private actors and nongovernmental organizations 
are driving the development of new legal and nonlegal strategies to 
protect the environment. These developments are blurring lines that 
traditionally separated conceptions of domestic and international law 
and public and private law. This is leading to the emergence of what I 
have called ―global environmental law.‖1  
One of the areas in which the concept of global environmental law 
can enhance understanding of contemporary legal evolution is the 
long struggle to develop standards of liability for global 
environmental harm. The scant progress that has been made in 
developing tort remedies in international law demonstrates the 
limitations of relying on public international law that primarily 
governs relations between states when seeking to regulate private 
 
† Robert F. Stanton Professor of Law and Director, Environmental Law 
Program, University of Maryland School of Law. This Article is based on remarks 
delivered at Multilateralism and Global Law: Evolving Conceptions of 
International Law and Governance at the University of Maryland School of Law 
(Oct. 23, 2009) and at the Seventh Annual Colloquium of the IUCN Academy of 
Environmental Law at Wuhan University in Wuhan, China (Nov. 2, 2009). 
1. See Robert V. Percival, The Globalization of Environmental Law, 26 PACE 
ENVTL L. REV. 451 (2009); Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence 
of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009). 
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activities that cause environmental harm. For centuries, legal systems 
around the world have acknowledged the principle that those who 
cause significant, foreseeable harm to others should be held liable for 
the damage they cause victims of this harm. The sic utere principle of 
ancient Roman law and the ―polluter pays‖ principle are now 
enshrined as universal elements of international environmental law, 
as recognized in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration2 and the 1992 Rio 
Declaration.3 While the nations of the world have pledged to develop 
liability standards to implement these principles,4 effective global 
liability rules ―are the Yeti of international environmental law—
pursued for years, sometimes spotted in rough outlines, but 
remarkably elusive in practice.‖5 More than a dozen civil liability 
treaties governing transnational environmental harm have been 
negotiated but most remain ―unadopted orphans in international 
environmental law.‖6 
This Article begins by reviewing the historical development of 
liability standards for environmental harm and their haphazard 
incorporation into public international law. It then discusses the 
obstacles that have made it difficult for victims of environmental 
harm to hold polluters liable even under domestic law. The Article 
then explores efforts to overcome these obstacles and the growth of 
private transnational litigation to recover for environmental harm. It 
concludes by arguing that the rise of global environmental law that 
includes ―bottom up‖ and private initiatives has become an important 
complement to traditional ―top down‖ efforts to develop international 
liability norms. As countries strengthen their own domestic liability 
standards to redress environmental harm, two issues will become 
 
2. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed., 
June 5–16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment, prin. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972), reprinted 
in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration], available at 
http://www.unep.org/Law/PDF/Stockholm_Declaration.pdf. 
3. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, princs. 2, 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992), reprinted 
in 33 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration], available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm. 
4. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 2, prin. 22; Rio Declaration, supra 
note 3, prin. 13. 
5. Noah Sachs, Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in 
International Environmental Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 837, 839 (2008). 
6. Id. at 837. 
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increasingly important: states’ receptiveness to entertain lawsuits by 
foreign plaintiffs and the development of reciprocity standards for the 
recognition of foreign judgments. Transnational private litigation 
ultimately will help provide further impetus for the development of 
global liability norms for environmental harm that will become an 
important part of the new architecture of global environmental law.  
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
For centuries, common law courts have embraced the ancient 
Roman law principle that no person has a right to cause significant, 
foreseeable harm to others. Expressed in the ancient Latin maxim sic 
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, this principle was explained by Lord 
Holt in 1704 in Tenant v. Goldwin as requiring that ―every man must 
so use his own as not to damnify another.‖7 A century and a half later, 
British courts addressed the question whether a violation of existing 
regulatory standards was a necessary precondition for tort liability. 
After briefly holding in Hole v. Barlow8 that compliance with 
existing regulatory standards could insulate an activity from tort 
liability, the British courts in Bamford v. Turnley9 overruled Hole and 
held that proof of pre-existing violations of regulatory standards was 
not a precondition for tort liability.  
The sic utere principle was recognized in an important 
international arbitration that has become one of the few precedents 
for international environmental law. In the Trail Smelter case,10 
farmers in Washington state, beginning in 1926, sought to hold liable 
the owners of a smelter across the Canadian border whose pollution 
had destroyed their crops. Because Washington state courts could not 
obtain jurisdiction over the Canadian smelter, the farmers asked the 
U.S. State Department to pursue relief for them pursuant to the 
Boundary Waters Treaty11 that provided for arbitration of disputes 
between the U.S. and Canada. After more than a decade of 
proceedings, an arbitral panel awarded damages to the farmers, based 
in large part on the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior recognition of the sic 
utere principle in domestic transboundary pollution disputes between 
 
7. Tenant v. Goldwin, (1704) 92 Eng. Rep. 222, 224 (K.B.). 
8. (1858) 140 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1114 (C.P.D). 
9. (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (K.B.). 
10. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938 (1941). 
11. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary 
Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.–Gr. Brit. (for Can.), Jan. 11, 
1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty]. 
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states.12 The arbitral tribunal declared that ―no State has the right to 
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause 
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or 
person therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the 
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.‖13 
In 1972 representatives from 113 nations gathered in Stockholm 
for the first global environmental summit—the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference). At 
the Stockholm Conference they embraced the sic utere principle in 
the first declaration of principles of global environmental law. 
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration states that: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction.14 
The Stockholm Declaration also urged the development of 
principles of liability for global environmental harm. Principle 22 of 
the Stockholm Declaration asserts that ―[s]tates shall cooperate to 
develop further the international law regarding liability and 
compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental 
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such 
States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.‖15 
In the intervening decades, scant progress has been made in 
implementing this promise. As Lakshman Guruswamy notes, ―thus 
far it does not appear that states are willing to engage in the delicate 
process of defining the conditions and scope of international 
responsibility for environmental damage.‖16 The concept of state 
responsibility for environmental harm has been included in the Third 
 
12. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
13. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965. The requirement of serious harm 
shown by clear and convincing evidence derived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
decision in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
14. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 2, prin. 21. 
15. Id. prin. 22. 
16. LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 327 (1994). 
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Restatement of Foreign Relations, which describes it as ―rooted in 
customary international law,‖17 but scant progress has been made in 
implementing it in practice. 
In 1992, twenty years after the Stockholm Conference, the 172 
governments participating in the Rio ―Earth Summit‖ pledged to 
work harder to develop global norms of state responsibility for 
environmental harm. Thus, Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development declares: 
States shall develop national law regarding liability and 
compensation for the victims of pollution and other 
environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an 
expeditious and more determined manner to develop further 
international law regarding liability and compensation for 
adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities 
within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their 
jurisdiction.18 
Despite efforts by the International Law Commission,19 little 
further progress has been made in the subsequent decades on 
developing principles of state responsibility for environmental harm. 
Several treaties have provisions that incorporate the sic utere 
principle, but there is no consensus concerning how it should be 
applied. More than a dozen multilateral agreements have been 
adopted to address global environmental problems.20 Yet only five of 
 
17. For a description of when state responsibility may be invoked, see 
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 601, 602 (1987). 
18. Rio Declaration, supra note 3, prin. 13. 
19. See Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by 
the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the 
1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of 
Industrial Accidents, May 21, 2003, U.N. Doc. MP/WAT/2003/1, 
CP.TEIA/2003/3, available at http://www.unece.org/env/civil-liability/documents/ 
protocol_e.pdf; Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 21 April 2004 on Environmental Liability With Regard to the 
Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56, 
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:3200 
4L0035:EN:NOT; UN International Law Commission, 56th Sess., May 3–4 & July 
5–Aug. 6, 2004, Report of the International Law Commission—Draft Principles on 
Environmental Liability, para. 175, U.N. Doc. A/59/10, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2004/2004report.htm. 
20. These include: the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy, the Convention on Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, the 
IAEA Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Convention 
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these have entered into force21 and all of these address liability for 
either oil spills or nuclear accidents. The classic illustration of the 
inadequacy of existing international law on state responsibility for 
transboundary environmental harm is the fact that no nation asserted 
any liability claims for the April 1986 nuclear accident in Chernobyl, 
the worst such accident in history.22 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND ―THE CAUSATION 
CONUNDRUM‖  
Most developed countries now rely on comprehensive regulatory 
systems in recognition of the limitations of tort liability as a vehicle 
for controlling environmental risks. In situations where large, single 
sources of pollutants, such as smelters, caused visible environmental 
damage, the common law tort of nuisance could provide some 
measure of redress to plaintiffs. But in a modern world awash in 
pollutants from multiple sources, the difficulty of proving causal 
injury has made common law liability too crude a vehicle to 
compensate those exposed to environmental hazards. To be sure, 
when a particular toxic substance, such as asbestos, causes ―signature 
 
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting From the Exploration for and 
Exploitation of Seabed Resources, the UNECE Convention on Civil Liability for 
Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland 
Navigation Vessels, the International Maritime Organization Convention on Civil 
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, the International Convention on the 
Establishment of an International Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, Council of 
Europe Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, the International Maritime Organization 
Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, the Basel Protocol on Liability and 
Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movement of Hazardous 
Wastes, the International Maritime Organization Convention on Civil Liability for 
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, and the UNECE Protocol on Civil Liability and 
Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents on Transboundary Waters. Sachs, supra note 5, at 854–57. 
21. These are the: Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy, IAEA Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 
International Maritime Organization Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund 
for Oil Pollution Damage, IMO International Maritime Organization Convention 
on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage. Id. 
22. See EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND POLICY 419–423 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that the Chernobyl accident contributed 
to the adoption of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, 
Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1391 (1986) and the Convention on Assistance in the 
Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 
1377 (1986)). 
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injuries‖ uniquely tied to exposure to it, the ―causation conundrum‖ 
can be overcome. Yet even in the case of asbestos, because exposure 
to this deadly substance caused fatal diseases with a long latency 
period, liability was imposed only decades after exposure to the 
products containing it.23 
Some countries have adopted liability standards for environmental 
harm that shift or relax the burden of proving causal injury. These 
efforts recognize the difficulty of satisfying individualized causation 
standards when large populations are exposed to an environmental 
hazard. Scientists can estimate how many people are likely to be 
harmed by such exposures, even if they cannot identify which 
particular individuals who have a disease have it as a result of the 
exposure.  
In the United States, the ―Superfund‖ legislation holds broad 
classes of parties associated with the generation and disposal of toxic 
substances strictly and jointly and severally liable for the costs of 
remediating releases of them, but it does not provide compensation 
for the victims of such releases.24 A creative effort to relax causation 
standards in order to compensate those exposed to radiation from 
atmospheric nuclear testing by the U.S. government during the 1950s 
and 1960s was reversed on sovereign immunity grounds.25 Congress 
responded to this decision by creating a program of administrative 
compensation to permit certain classes of people who were exposed 
to radiation from nuclear testing to recover modest amounts.26 
While individual smokers repeatedly failed to win lawsuits against 
manufacturers of tobacco products, the industry’s fortunes turned 
 
23. See David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos—
Carnage, Cover-up and Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1695 (1986) (reviewing 
PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL 
(1985)). Rosenberg notes that the history of the asbestos litigation demonstrates 
that ―the tort system emerged as the uniquely effective and indispensable means of 
exposing and defeating the asbestos conspiracy . . . if left to other devices, the 
asbestos conspiracy would have been buried along with its victims.‖ Id.  
24. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (2006). The word ―compensation‖ was 
incorporated in the name of the statute before an amendment deleted an 
administrative compensation scheme from it. 
25. See Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424 (10th Cir. 1987). 
26. See Veterans Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act, 
Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1154); Radiation 
Exposure Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-426, 104 Stat. 920 (1990) (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 2210). 
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when state attorneys general adopted a concerted strategy to hold the 
companies liable for the increased health costs states incurred due to 
the use of tobacco products. In 1998, state attorneys general reached 
a master settlement agreement in which the tobacco companies 
agreed to pay $206 billion over twenty-five years to compensate the 
states for increased health costs caused by tobacco-related diseases. 
This settlement attracted the attention of foreign governments eager 
to recover for similar costs incurred due to the export of tobacco 
products. 
Other nations also have made efforts to overcome the causation 
conundrum in environmental cases. Chinese law purports to shift the 
burden of proof to polluters to disprove causation in certain 
circumstances. Once plaintiffs have demonstrated that they have 
suffered harm associated with exposure to environmental pollutants, 
China’s Civil Code authorizes shifting the burden to defendants to 
disprove that their discharges of these pollutants caused the harm.27 In 
April 2009, China’s Supreme People’s Court awarded damages 
against a textile mill for harm to a fish farm that occurred in 1994 
because the textile mill could not disprove that its discharges were 
the source of the harm.28  
Japan has amended its tort law to make it easier for victims of 
environmental harm to recover compensation. When residents of the 
fishing village of Minamata suffered severe mercury poisoning 
beginning in the mid-1950s, the Chisso Chemical Company contested 
 
27. See Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil 
Procedures, art. 4 (promulgated by the Judicial Committee of the Sup. People’s Ct., 
Dec. 6, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 16, 2010) 
(P.R.C.). Burden-shifting provisions also are contained in article 86 of China’s 
Solid Waste Pollution Control Law and article 87 of its Water Pollution Control 
Law. See Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of 
Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes, art. 86 (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005) 
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 16, 2010) (P.R.C.); Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, art. 87 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2008, effective June 
1, 2008), LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 16, 2010) (P.R.C.). These were 
invoked to shift the burden of proof and hold the Rongping Chemical Plant strictly 
liable for pollution. See Zhang Changjian et al. v. Rongping Chemical Plant (on file 
with author). 
28. Zhejiang Province Pinghu Normal Special Species Farm v. Jiaxing Buyun 
Dying and Chemical Factory, Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of 
China, Civil Judgment No. 5 [2006] of the Retrial Instance of the Second Division, 
Apr. 2, 2009 (on file with author). 
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claims that its waste disposal practices had caused the harm, but it did 
not cease dumping mercury into Minamata Bay until 1968. After a 
lengthy legal battle extending over decades, Chisso was held liable in 
March 1973 for dumping toxic chemicals during the period 1932–68 
that caused the ―Minamata disease‖ despite its claim that its 
discharges had complied with all applicable laws and regulations.29  
The Minamata tragedy helped spur the development of new laws in 
Japan to provide compensation to victims of environmental harm. In 
1969, the Law Concerning Special Measures for the Relief of 
Pollution-Related Health Damage was adopted.30 This law authorized 
the designation of certain geographical areas as polluted areas, and it 
mandated that the government provide health benefits to residents 
certified as having pollution-induced health damage. 
In 1969, victims of air pollution filed the Yokkaichi Air Pollution 
Lawsuit. Three years later, in 1972, the plaintiffs in this case 
prevailed,31 which helped spur enactment of the so-called Absolute 
Liability Law.32 The following year, the Pollution-Related Health 
Damage Compensation Law was enacted.33 This law provides 
government living assistance to pollution victims in addition to 
compensation for the medical costs of victims, which is funded by 
emissions charges on polluters.  
Certified pollution victims filed several air pollution lawsuits 
between 1977 and 1983. After revisions were made to Japan’s Health 
Compensation Law, in 1989 the Japanese environmental agency 
canceled the designations of pollution areas and stopped certifying 
victims. In response to these changes in the law, new lawsuits were 
 
29. See Watanabe v. Chisso K. K., 696 HANJI 15 (Kumamoto Dist. Ct., Mar. 20, 
1973). 
30. Kogai ni kakaru kenkō higai no kyusai ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi hō [Law 
Concerning Special Measures for the Relief of Pollution-Related Health Damage], 
Law No. 90 of 1969 (Japan). 
31. See Shiono v. Shōwa Yokkaichi Sekiyu, 672 HANJI 30 (Tsu D. Ct., 
Yokkaichi Branch, July 24, 1972). 
32. In June 1972, Japan enacted article 25 to its Air Pollution Control Law and 
article 19 to its Water Pollution Control Law, which provides for absolute liability 
whenever any air pollutant or water pollutant injures human life or health. See Taiki 
osen bōshi hō [Air Pollution Control Law], Law No. 97 of 1968, art. 25 (Japan), 
translated at http://www.asianlii.org/jp/legis/laws/apcl273/; Suisbitsu odaku bōshi 
hō [Water Pollution Control Law], Law No. 138 of 1970, art. 19 (Japan), translated 
at http://www.asianlii.org/jp/legis/laws/wpcl310/. 
33. Kōgai kenkō higai no hoshō tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Pollution-Related Health 
Damage Compensation Law], Law No. 111 of 1973 (Japan). 
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filed by pollution victims in 1988 and 1989. 
Efforts to compensate pollution victims also occurred at the local 
level. Twelve local governments, including Tokyo and Osaka, 
established their own systems to pay medical care expenses and 
compensate more than 76,000 certified victims. In 1988, victims of 
air pollution from a steel mill won their Chiba Kawasaki Steel 
lawsuit.34 Other plaintiffs were victorious in subsequent lawsuits. In 
March 1991, plaintiffs in the first Osaka Nishiyodogawa lawsuit 
prevailed, which precipitated a favorable settlement for them in 
March 1995.35 In July 1995, plaintiffs won the second, third, and 
fourth Nishiyodogawa lawsuits, holding both the national 
government and the expressway corporation liable for harm caused 
by air pollution.36  
After prevailing in lawsuits against steel companies, Japanese 
plaintiffs turned to pollution from automobiles. In August 1998, the 
Kawasaki Pollution decision recognized health damage caused by 
automobile pollution and the right of victims of such pollution to 
recover compensation.37 This served as a precedent for the massive 
Tokyo Air Pollution lawsuit that extended over the decade from 1996 
to 2006.38 Six groups of asthma victims sued the Japanese 
government, the Tokyo city government, and all seven major 
Japanese automakers.39 An appellate court ultimately proposed a 1.2 
billion yen settlement to provide compensation to 527 pollution 
victims.40 Most of this settlement was to be paid by automobile 
manufacturers. The settlement agreement was accepted on July 3, 
2007.41 
 
34. See Judgment of Nov. 17, 1988, Chiba [District Court] Hanji, Heisei 1 Nen 
8 Gatsu 5 Nichi Go 161 (Japan) (Kawasaki Steel Company Case). 
35. See Nakajima v. Japan, 1383 HANJI 22 (Osaka D. Ct., Mar. 29, 1991). 
36. See Hamada v. Japan, 1538 HANJI 17 (Osaka D. Ct., July 5, 1995). 
37. See Miyata v. Japan, 1658 HANJI 3 (Yokohama D. Ct., Kawasaki Branch, 
Aug. 5, 1998). 
38. See The Tokyo Air Pollution Lawsuit, 1885 HANJI 23 (Tokyo D. Ct., Oct. 
29, 2002). 
39. These include: Toyota, Isuzu, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Nissan Diesel, 
and Toyota subsidiary Hino Motors. 
40. Yang & Percival, supra note 1, at 618 n.4 (internal citation omitted); Eri 
Osaka, Reevaluating the Role of the Tort Liability System in Japan, 26 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 420–21 (2009). 
41. Osaka, supra note 40, at 421.  
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III. LIABILITY FOR TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL HARM 
Despite the Georgia v. Tennessee Copper42 and Trail Smelter43 
precedents, successful tort recoveries for transboundary 
environmental harm have been exceedingly rare. Yet as scientists 
improve their ability to trace the long-range fate and transport of 
pollutants, our awareness of the seriousness of transboundary 
pollution problems has only increased. We now know that as much as 
thirty percent of mercury pollution in the western U.S. originates in 
Asia, primarily from emissions of coal-fired power plants in China.44 
Yet it remains unlikely that common law liability can be used 
effectively to redress such transboundary environmental harm. 
Concern over global warming and climate change—perhaps the 
most serious example of transboundary environmental harm—has 
spurred litigation by state governments and private parties against 
large sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In 2004, eight 
states and the city of New York filed federal and state common law 
nuisance actions seeking to require utilities operating the largest U.S. 
coal-fired power plants to reduce their GHG emissions. In 2005, a 
federal trial court judge dismissed the litigation as a nonjusticiable 
―political question.‖45 In September 2009 (after a lengthy delay 
caused partly by the court awaiting the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Massachusetts v. EPA46 decision), the Second Circuit reversed the 
district court’s decision.47 The court ruled that the case did not present 
a nonjusticiable political question, that the plaintiffs had standing to 
sue, and that the case was not preempted by the federal Clean Air 
Act.48 Defendants in the litigation operate power plants that 
contribute ten percent of U.S. GHG emissions.  
 
42. 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
43. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1938 (1941). 
44. Matt Pottinger, Steve Stecklow & John J. Fialka, Invisible Export: A Hidden 
Cost of China’s Growth—Mercury Migration, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2004, at A1. 
Chinese mercury emissions also have been blamed for half of Korea’s mercury 
pollution. See China Blamed for Half of Korea’s Mercury Pollution, CHOSUN ILBO 
(Seoul), Apr. 23, 2007, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/04/23/2 
007042361024.html. 
45. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
46. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
47. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009). 
48. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C.). 
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In October 2009, a Fifth Circuit panel followed suit by reversing a 
district court decision holding that climate change litigation raised a 
nonjusticiable political question.49 The lawsuit, brought by victims of 
Hurricane Katrina, alleges that oil companies’ emissions of GHGs 
exacerbated the damage caused by the hurricane. On February 26, 
2010, the Fifth Circuit vacated the panel decision and agreed to 
rehear it en banc. The Ninth Circuit also is considering the same issue 
in a lawsuit brought by residents of a small coastal village in Alaska 
who are seeking $400 million to relocate their village to higher 
ground due to sea level rise.50 The residents are seeking the damages 
from twenty-four oil companies and power plants on the theory that 
their emissions of GHGs are contributing to global warming that is 
causing the sea to rise.51 
While these early decisions suggest that trial courts are reluctant to 
entertain litigation seeking to hold private parties liable for climate 
change, eventually such a case may come to trial, though it may be 
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail. The same global ―tragedy of the 
commons‖ that is making it difficult for the nations of the world to 
agree on a binding treaty to control GHG emissions also may account 
for their general failure to agree on global liability standards for 
environmental harm, as Noah Sachs has ably explained.52 As Thomas 
Merrill has explored, in the context of bilateral transboundary 
pollution problems, the interests of upwind and upstream source 
states are quite different from the interests of downwind or 
downstream victims of pollution. This reduces opportunities for 
negotiated solutions that benefit both parties.53 Merrill suggests 
adopting a ―reverse golden rule‖ approach that would hold states 
 
49. Comer v. Murphy Oil, USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009). 
50. Rachel D’Oro, Kivalina, Alaska: Eroding Village Appeals Lawsuit’s 
Dismissal, Blames Corporations for Climate Change, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 28, 
2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/29/kivalina-appeals-eroding-_n_441 
420.html. 
51. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D. 
Cal. 2009) (The trial court dismissed the case as presenting a nonjusticiable 
political question.). 
52. Sachs, supra note 5, at 867–98 (describing the factors preventing agreement 
on civil liability regimes for transboundary environmental harm as including 
interest conflicts between developed states and developing states, high transaction 
costs and low expected payoffs, and the stringent content of proposed liability 
standards). 
53. Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L. 
J. 931, 935 (1997). 
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affected by pollution to the same standards of liability to which they 
hold their own domestic sources.54 Yet this concept has not been 
incorporated in treaties to resolve transboundary conflicts between 
nations because the countries have little incentive to agree to subject 
themselves to new liability regimes. 
IV. TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TORT LITIGATION 
Despite the failure of public international law to flesh out in any 
detail state responsibility for transboundary environmental harm, 
private parties have been aggressively pursuing transnational 
environmental tort litigation.  
In the new era of global environmental law, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) play a major role in exposing environmentally 
damaging activities by multinational corporations even in the most 
remote areas of the world.55 Greenpeace International, for example, 
was among the first global NGOs to expose toxic waste dumping in 
developing countries.56 
When the regulatory system fails to prevent incidents of substantial 
harm, victims may pursue private, transnational litigation. Now that 
the U.S. Supreme Court has made it very difficult to use the Alien 
Tort Claims Act to bring environmental lawsuits in the United 
States,57 plaintiffs increasingly are suing multinationals in the country 
where the harm occurs.  
A. Forum Non Conveniens 
In the absence of any global enforcement entity, difficult questions 
are arising concerning the appropriate venues for seeking redress for 
environmental harm caused by caused by multinational corporations. 
 
54. Id. at 998. 
55. Yang & Percival, supra note 1, at 634. 
56. This is well illustrated by the saga of the Karin B, a ship that dumped toxic 
waste from Italy on beach in Nigeria in 1988. After Greenpeace International 
exposed the waste dumping, the Nigerian government threatened to imprison the 
Italian ambassador and the waste was quickly retrieved by the dumpers. Steven 
Greenhouse, Toxic Waste Boomerang: Ciao Italy!, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1988, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/03/world/toxic-waste-boomerang-ciao-
italy.html?pagewanted=1. 
57. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (holding that for a case 
to be brought under the Alien Tort Statute plaintiffs must establish that the 
allegedly wrongful act violates the ―law of nations,‖ shorthand for universally 
applicable principles of law at the time the statute was enacted by the First U.S. 
Continental Congress). 
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While U.S. companies initially argued that they should not be subject 
to suit in the U.S. for harm caused abroad, they are now starting to 
change their tune as lawsuits against them are progressing in other 
venues (e.g., a lawsuit against Chevron for environmental harm from 
oil drilling in the Oriente that is being heard in the Ecuadoran courts). 
A key issue facing future courts will be standards domestic courts 
should employ in enforcing liability judgments rendered against 
multinational corporations by foreign courts. 
Victims of environmental harm increasingly are turning to 
transnational litigation to seek compensation for their injuries. In 
addition to the usual difficulties of proving causation in toxic tort 
cases, foreign plaintiffs face other formidable obstacles. American 
courts often refuse to hear cases brought by plaintiffs injured in 
foreign countries by invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
as illustrated by the litigation over the Bhopal tragedy, which was 
rejected by American courts.58 Because American tort law has been 
perceived to be more generous to plaintiffs than the law in most 
foreign countries,59 the choice of forum can have a substantial impact 
on the amount of damages recoverable.  
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro,60  banana workers in Costa Rica 
claimed that they had been injured by a pesticide (1,2-Dibromo-3-
Chloropropane, or DBCP) that EPA had banned within the United 
States but which continues to be produced in the United States for 
export abroad.61 The workers brought a tort action in Texas state 
court against the U.S. company that manufactured the pesticide. After 
the trial court dismissed the action, the plaintiffs appealed to the 
Texas Supreme Court. By a vote of 5-4, the court held that the case 
must be heard in Texas. In a concurring opinion, Justice Doggett 
 
58. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 
809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). See Victoria Arthaud, Environmental Destruction in 
the Amazon: Can U.S. Courts Provide a Forum for the Claims of Indigenous 
Peoples?, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL L. REV. 195 (1994). 
59. Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens, 
29 TEX. INT’L L. J. 321, 352 (1994); Russell J. Weintraub, The United States As A 
Magnet Forum and What, If Anything, To Do About It, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 213 (Jack L. Goldsmith ed., 
1997). 
60. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990). 
61. The pesticide DBCP to which the plaintiffs were exposed had been banned 
in the United States since 1977. For a history behind this ban, see DEVRA DAVIS, 
WHEN SMOKE RAN LIKE WATER: TABLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECEPTION AND 
THE BATTLE AGAINST POLLUTION 195–200 (2002). 
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argued that ―[c]omity is not achieved when the United States allows 
its multinational corporations to adhere to a double standard when 
operating abroad and subsequently refuses to hold them accountable 
for those actions.‖62 Agreeing with the majority that Texas law did 
not permit the case to be dismissed on forum non conveniens 
grounds, he concluded that: 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is obsolete in a world in 
which markets are global and in which ecologists have 
documented the delicate balance of all life on this planet. The 
parochial perspective embodied in the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens enables corporations to evade legal control merely 
because they are transnational. This perspective ignores the 
reality that actions of our corporations affecting those abroad 
will also affect Texans. Although DBCP is banned from use 
within the United States, it and other similarly banned 
chemicals have been consumed by Texans eating foods 
imported from Costa Rica and elsewhere. In the absence of 
meaningful tort liability in the United States for their actions, 
some multinational corporations will continue to operate 
without adequate regard for the human and environmental 
costs of their actions. This result cannot be allowed to repeat 
itself for decades to come.63  
In the past, dismissals by U.S. courts on forum non conveniens 
grounds usually spelled the end of efforts to hold a defendant liable. 
One study concluded that fewer than four percent of cases dismissed 
by American courts on this ground ever are litigated in foreign 
courts.64 Even when cases dismissed by U.S. courts later were filed in 
foreign jurisdictions, they rarely were successful in holding 
defendants accountable for the full measure of the harm they 
caused.65 At the time Alfaro was decided by the Supreme Court of 
 
62. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 687 (Doggett, J., concurring). 
63. Id. at 689 (internal citations omitted). 
64. David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A 
Rather Fantastic Fiction”, 103 LAW Q. REV. 398, 419 (1987). In his concurring 
opinion in Alfraro, Justice Doggett in a footnote cited Professor Robertson’s study, 
noting that it had found that only one personal injury case out of fifty-five surveyed 
and only two commercial cases out of thirty surveyed had reached trial overseas. 
Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 683 n.5 (Doggett, J., concurring). 
65. After the Bhopal litigation was rejected by courts in the United States, the 
Supreme Court of India approved a settlement in 1989 that barred all actions 
against Union Carbide, the owner of the plant involved in the Bhopal tragedy, in 
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Texas, Costa Rican law would have limited the plaintiffs’ recoveries 
to no more than $1,500 each.66 Because the case could be tried in 
Texas, the eighty-two plaintiffs and their wives ultimately received a 
settlement worth nearly $20 million, shortly before the case was 
scheduled to go to trial in 1992.67 One factor leading to the settlement 
was the plaintiffs’ concern that the Texas legislature would adopt 
legislation reversing the Alfaro holding. In February 1993, the Texas 
legislature passed legislation reinstating the forum non conveniens 
doctrine effective September 1, 1993.68  
The Alfaro case was not the end of tort suits against U.S. chemical 
companies by foreign banana workers exposed to DBCP. In May 
1997, Shell, Dow Chemical Co., and Occidental Chemical Corp. 
settled a class action filed on behalf of 13,000 banana workers in the 
Philippines, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Costa 
Rica who allegedly became sterile or suffered other health problems 
as a result of exposure to DBCP.69 Although the companies 
maintained that any harm to the workers was caused by misuse of the 
pesticide, they agreed to create a $41.5 million fund to compensate 
the workers.70 The first payments from the fund were received by the 
workers in December 1997.71 Workers who suffered health problems 
 
return for a payment of $470 million to compensate the victims. Efforts to overturn 
the settlement have not been successful. More than 3,000 people were killed and 
more than 100,000 were injured by the gas leak. See Suketu Mehta, A Cloud Still 
Hangs Over Bhopal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 2009, at A43, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/opinion/03mehta.html; Rhys Blakely, 
Activists Mark Bhopal Anniversary With Renewed Call for Justice, TIMESONLINE, 
Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6942219. 
ece. 
66. Developments in the Law—International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 1484, 1618 (1991). 
67. Davis, supra note 61, at 200. The Alfaro decision may have opened the door 
to similar lawsuits on behalf of foreigners allegedly injured by U.S. corporations. In 
October 1991, a toxic tort suit was filed against a company in Brownsville, Texas 
on behalf of a group of more than sixty Mexican children who are deformed or 
retarded. John M. McClintock, In Matamoros, Residents’ Rage at Polluting U.S.-
Owned Companies Is Growing, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 19, 1992, at A8, available at 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-01-19/news/1992019023_1_matamoros-
birth-defects-mexicans. 
68. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051 (Vernon 2010); 1993 TEX. 
SESS. LAW SERV. ch. 4 (S.B. 2) (West 2008). 
69. See Rick Kennedy, Fruit of the Poison Tree: In a Dallas Court, Costa Rican 
Banana Workers Claim a Banana Pesticide Left Them Sterile, DALLAS OBSERVER, 
Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.dallasobserver.com/content/printVersion/285584.  
70. Id. 
71. Filipino Workers Receive Compensation from Banana Pesticide Settlement 
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received between $800 and $5,000, depending on the seriousness of 
their problems. Workers unable to document health problems but 
who could show they were exposed to DBCP were to receive $100 
each. While these payments are small by U.S. standards, the average 
daily wage of a Filipino banana worker was approximately $4.60 at 
the time.72 
For nearly two decades, residents of the Oriente region of Ecuador 
have been suing Texaco and its successor corporation Chevron 
seeking compensation for, and remediation of, severe pollution from 
oil drilling operations that occurred during the 1970s. Texaco initially 
persuaded a federal trial court in New York to dismiss the litigation 
on the ground of forum non conveniens. But in Jota v. Texaco, Inc.,73 
the Second Circuit reversed this dismissal. The court held that the 
district court should not have used the doctrine of forum non 
conveniens to dismiss the case without at least requiring the company 
to submit to Ecuador’s jurisdiction. In subsequent litigation, the court 
affirmed the dismissal of the suit only on the condition that Texaco 
submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadoran courts.74 
B. Establishing a Violation of “the Law of Nations” Under the 
Alien Tort Statute 
The Ecuador oil pollution litigation and several other lawsuits have 
been brought by aliens in federal court against U.S. corporations 
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The ATS, which was adopted as 
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, gives federal courts jurisdiction to 
hear a civil action by ―an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.‖75 In Beanal v. 
Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,76 Tom Beanal, the leader of the Amungme 
Tribal Council of Lambaga Adat Suki Amungme, sued U.S. mining 
companies that operated an open pit copper, gold, and silver mine in 
Indonesia. Bringing his suit in federal district court in Louisiana 
pursuant to the ATS, Beanal alleged that the companies had caused 
great harm to him and the members of his tribe by discharging 
100,000 tons of tailings per day in several rivers, rendering them 
 
Fund, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1997, at B9C. 
72. Id. 
73. 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998). 
74. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002). 
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2008). 
76. 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999). 
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unusable for bathing and drinking.77  
After his claims were dismissed by the trial court,78 Beanal 
appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed 
the dismissal of Beanal’s claims. It held that his complaint failed to 
allege facts that would constitute a violation of the ―law of nations,‖ 
as required by the ATS.79 The court held that the ATS ―applies only 
to shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized 
principles of international law.‖80  The court stated that the Rio 
Declaration and other sources of international environmental law 
―merely refer to a general sense of environmental responsibility‖ and 
―abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable 
standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute 
international environmental abuses or torts.‖81 The court also found 
persuasive ―the argument to abstain from interfering in a sovereign’s 
environmental practices . . . especially when the alleged 
environmental torts and abuses occur within the sovereign’s borders 
and do not affect neighboring countries.‖82  
In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,83 the Second Circuit 
affirmed the dismissal of another ATS lawsuit brought by residents of 
Peru against a U.S. company operating a copper smelter in their 
neighborhood. The court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations that 
uncontrolled emissions from the smelter injured their health and 
threatened their lives did not rise to the level of a violation of the 
―law of nations‖ as required to state a case under the ATS because it 
involved only ―intranational pollution.‖84 
By setting such a high bar for establishing a violation of the ―law 
of nations,‖ these decisions foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain85 decision. In Sosa, the Court held that the 
 
77. Id. at 163, 166. 
78. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997). 
79. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 167. 
80. Id. (quoting Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983)) (per 
curiam). 
81. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 167. 
82. Id. For a discussion of the history of the Alien Tort Claims Act and efforts 
to apply it to remedy environmental abuses, see Richard L. Herz, Litigating 
Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment, 
40 VA. J. INT’L L. 545 (2000). 
83. 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003). 
84. Id. at 253–59. 
85. 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
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ATS can be used only to seek redress for actions that violate 
―specific, universal, and obligatory‖ norms recognized as part of the 
―law of nations‖ at the time the law was enacted.86 While some 
observers believe that Sosa effectively gutted the ATS, at least as a 
vehicle for redressing global environmental harm, others believe that 
it still provides an important avenue for redress when environmental 
harm is coupled with egregious human rights violations.87   
The latter view acquired some force as plaintiffs in two post-Sosa 
cases have recovered substantial settlements when human rights 
abuses were coupled with environmental claims. In December 2004, 
plaintiffs who claimed that the Unocal Corporation had colluded with 
the Burmese military to use forced labor, murder, and rape in 
connection with construction of an oil pipeline won a favorable 
settlement in an ATS case. Filed as a class action four years earlier by 
fifteen Burmese villagers, the lawsuit alleged that the Unocal 
Corporation should be held liable for forced labor, murder, rape, and 
torture inflicted on natives of Burma by the country’s military in the 
course of construction of an oil pipeline. After the district court 
dismissed the lawsuits,88 the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit. 
A panel of the Ninth Circuit held in September 2002 that Unocal 
could be found liable under the ATS for aiding and abetting the 
military’s actions if the plaintiffs’ allegations were found to be true at 
trial.89 In February 2003, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel’s 
decision and agreed to rehear the case en banc.90 The case was argued 
before the en banc court after Sosa was decided, and the U.S. 
government supported dismissal of the lawsuits.91 However, after the 
oral argument did not go well for Unocal, a settlement was reached.92 
While the terms of the settlement are confidential, Unocal announced 
that it ―will compensate plaintiffs and provide funds enabling 
 
86. Id. at 724–25, 732. 
87. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES 
175 (2008) (arguing that Sosa’s reference to ―specific, universal and obligatory‖ 
norms is ―not to be taken literally‖ and that ―with sufficient qualification and 
explanation every norm in international law is sufficiently specific to warrant 
liability‖). 
88. Doe I v. Unocol Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000). 
89. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). 
90. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003). 
91. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).  
92. Unocal, 403 F.3d at 708. See Marc Lifhser, Unocal Settles Human Rights 
Lawsuit Over Alleged Abuses at Myanmar Pipeline, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at 
C1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/22/business/fi-unocal22. 
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plaintiffs and their representatives to develop programs to improve 
living conditions, health care and education and protect the rights of 
people from the pipeline region.‖93 
Another ATS suit coupling environmental and human rights claims 
was settled in June 2009 on the eve of trial. Survivors of Nigerian 
environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa used the ATS to sue Royal 
Dutch Shell for its alleged complicity in the Nigerian military’s 
execution of Saro-Wiwa in 1995. In December 2008, Chevron had 
won another high profile ATS case when a jury in San Francisco 
ruled in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp. that the oil company was not 
responsible for human rights abuses when the Nigerian military 
suppressed an environmental protest against its drilling practices.94 
But Royal Dutch Shell settled the Saro-Wiwa case by agreeing to pay 
$15.5 million to his survivors.95 The settlement was reached just as 
the trial was about to commence after thirteen years of litigation. 
Shell maintained that it had no involvement in the execution of Sara-
Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders who had been protesting oil 
pollution in the Niger Delta. It described the settlement as a 
―humanitarian gesture.‖96 However, the settlement was widely 
viewed as an effort to prevent embarrassing revelations at trial 
concerning the company’s support for the Nigerian military’s 
repressive tactics. 
C. Prudential Standing 
A more extreme obstacle to lawsuits in U.S. courts by foreigners to 
recover for environmental harm is the notion that nonresident aliens 
do not have prudential standing to sue. On June 20, 2001, the 
International Labor Rights Fund, which represents eleven villagers 
from Aceh, Indonesia, sued the Exxon/Mobil Corporation in federal 
district court in Washington, D.C.97 The lawsuit seeks to hold 
 
93. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law—
Tentative Settlement of ATCA Human Rights Suits Against Unocal, 99 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 479, 498 (2005) (quoting Press Release, Unocal Corp., Settlement Reached in 
Human Rights Lawsuit, Dec. 13, 2004). 
94. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008); 
Verdict and Settlement Summary, Bowoto v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. C 99-
02506 SI, 2008 WL 5483539 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 1, 2008). 
95. Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/b 
usiness/global/09shell.html. 
96. Id. 
97. See Doe v. ExxonMobil, No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. July 29, 2002). 
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ExxonMobil accountable for human rights abuses by Indonesian 
soldiers guarding the company’s oil facilities in Indonesia. It alleges 
that the company bought military equipment and paid mercenaries 
who have assisted Indonesian security forces in efforts to crush 
dissent by torturing and assaulting villagers. Exxon denies 
responsibility for the behavior of the Indonesian military and says 
that it condemns the violation of human rights in any form. In 2006, 
the court refused to dismiss the case despite a State Department claim 
that it could have a ―serious[ly] adverse impact on significant 
interests of the United States, including interests related directly to 
the ongoing struggle against international terrorism.‖98 However, in a 
subsequent companion case assigned to the same judge, the court 
dismissed similar claims by holding that nonresident aliens have no 
standing to sue in U.S. courts.99 In his decision, Judge Royce 
Lamberth recognized that there was no question that the Indonesian 
plaintiffs had made sufficient allegations of harm to establish 
standing under Article III of the Constitution.100 Noting that 
―plaintiffs allege that members of the Indonesian military committed 
the torts . . . during a period of martial law,‖ Judge Lamberth 
concluded that he could ―see no reason to find that plaintiffs have 
standing in this unique factual context.‖101 
Similar decisions have kept foreign governments from pursuing 
lawsuits to hold U.S. tobacco companies liable for the harm caused 
by their products. While individuals frequently failed to win lawsuits 
seeking to hold manufacturers of tobacco products liable for the 
deadly diseases their products caused, in 1998 state attorneys general 
forced the industry to agree to pay $206 billion over twenty-five 
years to compensate the states for increased health costs caused by 
tobacco-related diseases. While the same products presumably cause 
the same harm outside of the U.S., to date no foreign plaintiff has 
been successful in holding a U.S. tobacco company liable. 
 
98. Letter of William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State, to Honorable 
Louis F. Oberdorfer, submitted in Doe v. ExxonMobil, No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. 
July 29, 2002), at 1 (on file with the Maryland Journal of International Law). See 
also Peter Waldman & Timothy Maples, A Global Journal Report: Administration 
Sets New Hurdles for Human-Rights Cases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at B1. 
99. Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 658 F. Supp.2d 131 (D.D.C. 2009). 
100. Id. at 134. 
101. Id. at 135 (internal citations omitted). 
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V. THE FOREIGN RESPONSE TO U.S. DISMISSALS 
The increasing reluctance of U.S. courts to entertain transnational 
tort litigation has spawned a backlash in some developing countries 
where plaintiffs reside. Some countries have adopted statutes 
designed to preclude forum non conveniens dismissals by U.S. courts 
by providing that their own courts automatically lose jurisdiction to 
hear a case once suit has been filed in a foreign court with 
jurisdiction.102 A model law, drafted by the Latin American 
Parliament (Parlatino) and widely adopted in Latin American 
countries allows damages to be calculated under the law of the 
foreign defendant’s country, eliminating the advantage to the 
defendant of being liable for lesser amounts in the courts of 
developing countries.103 These and other measures have significantly 
altered the calculus that now confronts multinational corporations. 
As noted above, when Texaco won dismissal of the ATS lawsuit 
filed against it by residents of the Oriente region of Ecuador, it was 
widely assumed that the company had escaped liability. Yet the case 
was refiled in the courts of Ecuador where litigation has now been 
under way for more than a decade. Eight years ago, Chevron acquired 
Texaco and with it responsibility for defending the lawsuit. After 
years of trial to assess responsibility for extensive environmental 
damage in the Oriente, Chevron now is facing the prospect of an 
adverse judgment potentially as large as $27 billion—the cost 
estimate of a court-appointed expert for compensation and 
remediation of the pollution.  
Chevron’s defense is that everything it did in Ecuador was legal 
and that it spent $40 million on environmental cleanup and was 
released from further liability by the government of Ecuador in 1992 
when Texaco left the country. The plaintiffs claim that this settlement 
with a too-compliant government does not absolve Chevron of 
responsibility for the harm its activities caused to the individual 
plaintiffs in the lawsuit. While the litigation over environmental 
devastation caused by oil production in Ecuador has been ongoing for 
nearly two decades, the basic legal question at the heart of the 
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controversy is remarkably simple: should governments be able to 
insulate private companies from liability for acts that foreseeably 
cause significant harm to others? 
In July 2009, Chevron officials conceded that the company is 
likely to lose the lawsuit and have an enormous judgment rendered 
against it. The company vowed that it will not pay such a judgment 
and that it will fight in the courts of both Ecuador and the U.S. for 
decades if necessary. While some shareholders have urged the 
company to settle, Chevron spokesperson Don Campbell told the 
Wall Street Journal that ―[w]e’re not going to be bullied into a 
settlement‖ because the company has done nothing wrong.104  
What is particularly ironic about Chevron’s legal posture is that, if 
the company had not fought having the case tried in U.S. courts under 
the ATS, it is highly likely that it would have prevailed on the merits, 
particularly in the wake of the Sosa decision. Chevron’s legal 
strategy seems to have been driven by the assumption that the risk of 
a foreign court effectively holding it liable was miniscule. Yet as 
global environmental law flourishes, countries throughout the world 
now are upgrading their judicial systems, making such assumptions 
increasingly questionable.  
In September 2009, Judge Juan Nuñez, the Ecuadoran judge 
presiding over the trial, recused himself from the case after Chevron 
released a video that the company claimed showed that the judge was 
committed to ruling against the oil company.105 In the video, which 
was posted on Chevron’s website, the judge reportedly refuses to 
reveal the verdict several times but then responds ―yes, sir‖ to a 
question Chevron claims was an inquiry as to whether Chevron will 
lose the lawsuit.106 There also reportedly is a discussion of how 
remediation funds Chevron would be ordered to pay will be spent and 
a suggestion that some could be used to pay off government officials. 
The video was covertly filmed by an Ecuadoran former contractor for 
Chevron who the oil company claims was acting entirely 
independently. While the judge claimed the video had been doctored 
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and denied that he had prejudged the case, he was asked to recuse 
himself by Washington Pezantes, the attorney general of Ecuador.107 
The quick recusal suggests that the Ecuadoran judiciary appreciates 
the importance of the case and the likely battle that would follow 
efforts to enforce any judgment against Chevron in the U.S. courts. 
Judge Nicolás Zambrano will now preside over the case, which is 
being heard in Lago Agrio, Ecuador. 
On September 23, 2009, Chevron announced that it had filed an 
international arbitration claim against the government of Ecuador in 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague.108 Chevron bases its 
claim on what it calls the Ecuadoran government’s ―exploitation‖ of 
the lawsuit.109 Chevron is asking the tribunal to enforce its 1998 
cleanup agreement with Petroecuador and a bilateral U.S.–Ecuador 
investment treaty. While Chevron’s move was widely expected, most 
observers thought it would not occur until after the litigation against 
the company was concluded in the Ecuadoran courts.110 Chevron now 
claims that it has no choice because ―Ecuador’s judicial system is 
incapable of functioning independently of political 
influence.‖111 Ecuadoran attorney general Diego Garcia rejected 
Chevron’s effort to impugn the integrity of the Ecuadoran judiciary 
and noted that the plaintiffs in the lawsuit before the Ecuadoran court 
are not parties to the arbitration proceeding Chevron has initiated in 
the Hague. 
As the Chevron litigation illustrates, a major issue likely to emerge 
from this transnational litigation will be the standards for enforcing 
foreign judgments in the face of charges that due process was not 
afforded. This already has become an issue in subsequent DBCP 
litigation in Nicaragua because of changes in procedures for proving 
claims.  
Nicaraguan courts had awarded more than $2.1 billion in damages 
to plaintiffs, using Special Law 364 enacted in 2001 to make it easy 
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for plaintiffs to recover in DBCP cases. As described by Los Angeles 
Superior Court Judge Victoria Chaney, under this law ―essentially 
anyone who obtains two required lab reports stating he is sterile and 
who claims to have been exposed to DBCP on a banana farm is 
entitled to damages; causation and liability are conclusively 
presumed . . . .‖112 Under special procedures prescribed by the law, 
the defendant must post a $15 million bond and ―has just 3 days to 
answer the complaint, the parties have 8 days to present evidence, 
and the court has 3 days to issue a judgment.‖113  
Judge Chaney dismissed DBCP lawsuits brought in Los Angeles 
Superior Court against the Dole Food Company because of fraud 
occurring in Nicaragua.114 The judge found the cases to be tainted by 
pervasive fraud by lawyers and others in Nicaragua who recruited 
plaintiffs who had never worked on banana plantations, falsified lab 
reports, and sought to intimidate witnesses who helped expose the 
fraud.115 In light of Judge Chaney’s conclusions concerning pervasive 
fraud in Nicaragua, it is unlikely Nicaraguan DBCP judgments will 
be enforced by U.S. courts. However, Judge Chaney did specifically 
state that her conclusions applied only to cases involving Nicaraguan 
plaintiffs and that no evidence of fraud has been presented involving 
DBCP plaintiffs from any other country.116 
In September 2009, the British oil trading firm Trafigura abruptly 
offered to settle a $160 million class action brought in London on 
behalf of 31,000 residents of the Ivory Coast allegedly harmed by the 
company’s dumping of hundreds of tons of toxic waste in Abidjan in 
August 2006. The company previously had been forced to clean up 
the waste at a cost of $200 million, but thousands of Abidjan 
residents claimed that exposure to the waste had caused severe health 
problems and even some deaths. The case against Trafigura had been 
scheduled to go to trial in Britain on October 6. Trafigura’s defense 
 
112. Rudolfo Mejia v. Dole Food Company, Inc., No. BC340079, at 23 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. June 17, 2009) (proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
supporting order terminating Mejia and Rivera cases for fraud on the court), 
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-Dole_Chan 
ey_ruling.pdf. 
113. Id. 
114. Steve Stecklow, Fraud by Trial Lawyers Taints Wave of Pesticide 
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125061508138340501.html. 
115. Id. 
116. Mejia, No. BC340079, at 24. 
PERCIVAL MACRO - 05-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE) 6/3/2010  1:42 PM 
62 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 25:37 
was to blame the waste dumping on an ―independent contractor.‖ It 
aggressively threatened to bring libel actions against media outlets 
who published reports favorable to the claimants. Yet when the 
Guardian newspaper revealed emails allegedly showing efforts by 
Trafigura to cover up its involvement in the waste dumping, 
Trafigura quickly announced that it had reached a nearly $50 million 
settlement with attorneys for the plaintiffs.117 While attorneys for the 
plaintiffs expressed approval of the settlement, Greenpeace argued 
that the company still should be prosecuted for manslaughter for 
deaths caused by the waste dumping.118 
VI. CONCLUSION: ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND GLOBAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  
Three years ago, in an article forecasting the future of 
environmental law, I predicted that as other nations upgrade their 
judicial systems, U.S. corporations eventually would prefer to be 
sued in U.S. courts rather than in foreign jurisdictions.119 The saga of 
the Chevron litigation in Ecuador may confirm the accuracy of this 
prediction much faster than anyone could have anticipated. This and 
other transnational environmental litigation is part of the more 
complex picture that has emerged concerning how global 
environmental law is developing today. Efforts devoted to the ―top 
down‖ approach of negotiating comprehensive, multilateral treaties 
on state responsibility have yielded scant progress. However, 
progress is being made in the development of environmental liability 
norms from the ―bottom up.‖  
NGOs and multinational corporations increasingly are fighting 
battles over environmental liability in the court of global public 
opinion. Even losing ATS cases have helped shine the glare of 
international publicity on questionable environmental practices that 
fall far short of what multinationals would use when operating in the 
developed world. In the Ecuador litigation, both Chevron and the 
plaintiffs are aggressively using all means available to influence 
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public opinion.120 Even apart from any relief mandated by a court, this 
litigation is likely to influence the development of norms for future 
corporate behavior in the developing world.  
Bilateral approaches to the development of liability standards also 
are making some progress and much of it is occurring through the 
actions of subnational units of government. Seven U.S. states and 
three Canadian provinces have adopted the Uniform Transboundary 
Pollution Reciprocal Access Act,121 which seeks to promote ―the 
equalization of rights and remedies of citizens in Canada and the 
U.S.A. affected by pollution emanating from the other 
jurisdiction.‖122 
Both the Chevron litigation in Ecuador and the Central American 
DBCP litigation are likely to spur further interest in the development 
of procedural norms for access to justice in transnational 
environmental litigation for both victims of environmental harm and 
the companies who seek a fair forum in which to defend themselves. 
As developing countries upgrade their judicial systems, the days 
when a foreign non conveniens dismissal was the death knell for 
claims, no matter how meritorious they might be seem to be, are 
fading into the past. Environmental liability disputes will remain 
messy and contentious, but they will be a necessary avenue for 
seeking redress when regulatory policy fails to prevent significant 
harm. They may also serve as a ―bottom up‖ catalyst for the further 
development of global environmental liability norms. 
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